We examine the effects of rivals' earnings news during the waiting period of an IPO's going public process on IPO pricing and completion decision, and investigate the implication of these effects for post-IPO operating performance. We find that a signal-to-noise measure of rivals' earnings news has significantly negative valuation effects on both price revision and initial return for completed offerings, but a significantly positive effect on withdrawal probability in a pooled sample of completed and withdrawn offerings.
Introduction
Substantial research in the IPO literature demonstrates that the long-run stock returns and profitability of firms going public underperform those of their competitors in the same industry by a wide margin.
1 This research suggests that investors may systematically be too optimistic about the prospects of firms going public and that the issuer takes advantage of windows of opportunity by issuing new shares. In this paper,
we examine whether and how investors and the issuer respond to the fundamental information revealed from rivals' earnings news in the pricing process of IPOs and the implications of the valuation effect if they do.
When an IPO firm files the registration statement with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), it commonly discloses information related to competition in its business and cautions investors about how its business may be harmed by competition. Surprisingly, little research is found regarding whether rival firms adversely affect new issuers, especially in light of the well-documented long-run underperformance in both stock returns and profitability.
Industry rivals compete for market shares, technological innovations, operating efficiency, financing, and possibly management team 2 , but much of the consequences of competition should ultimately enter the bottom line in the form of earnings. Winners of the competition should deliver good earnings whereas losers should 1 Ritter (1991) finds that IPOs underperform firms matched by size and industry in stock returns in the three-year period after the issuance. Loughran and Ritter (1995) confirm the stock return underperformance of IPOs in a large sample and for a 5-year period. They find that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) also underperform various market indexes and firms matched by size for up to 5 years in the postissue period. Brav and Gompers (1997) , however, show that the stocks of venture capital-backed IPOs do not underperform in the long run and the long-run underperformance is particularly associated with nonventure capital-backed IPOs. But they also show that the long-run underperformance is not limited to IPOs. Jain and Kini (1994) document a significant decline in operating performance subsequent to the IPO. Mikkelson et al. (1997) find that median operating return on assets decline from the year before the offering to the end of the first year of public trading but no more decline is observed afterwards.
2 Chemmanur and He (2009) show how competition for market share among private firms can lead to IPO waves. Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) models a firm's going-public decision as a tradeoff between underpricing and increased publicity (market share and product price). In Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) 's model, the firm that have a superior technology weighs better terms of external financing against the competitive effect induced by partially disclosing the technology to the firms that do not have the superior technology.
report bad earnings. Since new issuers are typically small, young, and growth firms, they are likely to be susceptible to competition from more established rivals in the industry. We argue that rivals' earnings news reflects the result of competition against new issuers in a competitive environment and contains fundamental information not only about rival firms but also the prospects of new issuers, for which such information is absent before they become publicly traded firms. Therefore, we focus on rivals' earnings news as a signal to the market about the change in the rivals' competitive positions relative to new issuers.
Extensive research in the intra-industry information transfers literature mostly finds a contagion effect, the effect arising from a common industry factor, for various corporate announcements and events 3 , except Hertzel (1991) , Lang and Stulz (1992) , Laux et al. (1998) , and Slovin et al. (1999) , who discover some evidence of a competitive effect. Hertzel (1991) finds a weak competitive effect of share repurchase announcements on rival firms identified to be adversely affected for a priori reasons. Lang and Stulz (1992) document that bankruptcy announcements in less competitive industry can benefit competitors. Laux et al. (1998) show that a competitive effect is more likely to be observed for weak firms within an industry because it has to offset the contagion effect. Slovin et al. (1999) find geographical rivals gain from the dividend reductions at and regulatory enforcement actions against regional banks. Because new issuers typically have a short operating history and are more likely to be in nascent industries, a competitive effect on IPOs may stem from rivals' earnings news. The central hypothesis of our study is that rivals' good (bad) earnings news may imply bad (good) news for new issuers after controlling for offer characteristics and the effect of an industry-wide component in earnings news. In other words, a negative (positive) valuation effect may result from rivals' good (bad) earnings news, ceteris paribus.
Competition from rival firms can adversely affect the valuation of an IPO firm primarily through two channels. First, competition may simply reduce an IPO's future profitability without affecting the riskiness of its future profitability. Suppose industry average P/E ratio is used along with an IPO's one-period-ahead forecasted earnings to value the IPO. Reduced earnings estimate implies lower valuation for the IPO. 4 Of course, reduced future profitability may only justify a lower P/E ratio. Thus, even with the one-period-ahead earnings estimate for the IPO unchanged the valuation will be lower. Second, competition may increase the idiosyncratic risk of an IPO's future cash flows and thus the idiosyncratic volatility of the IPO's stock returns.
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According to Merton (1987) , when investors hold undiversified portfolios idiosyncratic risk is positively priced and thus increases the required rate of return. However, the long-run underperformance of IPOs in stock returns suggests that this channel is not at work.
We construct a simple signal-to-noise ratio as the measure for rivals' earnings news. The signal-to-noise ratio is defined as a ratio of the sum to the standard deviation of rivals' earnings surprises. Since the price revision from filing price to offer price accrues to the issuer and investment banks but the initial return from offer price to the first closing trading price accrues to investors in new issues 6 , we examine who are bearing the valuation effect of rivals' earnings news by testing for the valuation effect on both price revision and initial return in a large sample of about 6800 completed IPOs and find that the signal-to-noise ratio measure has a significantly negative effect on both price revision and initial return. The results suggest that rivals' aggregate good (bad) earnings news leads to low (high) valuation of IPOs.
Several recent IPO studies argue that the pricing of an IPO can be viewed as a bargaining process between the issuer and investors, which is intermediated by investment banks. The parties involved bargain over the information related to the valuation of IPOs. For example, Busaba et al. (2001) argue that since underpricing new shares is a cost to the issuer, the option to withdraw an IPO decreases this cost because it gives the issuer bargaining power with respect to investment banks and investors. In Edelen and Kadlec (2005) 's rational model, the issuer does not fully adjust offer price to good public information because full adjustment will likely deter investment banks and investors and thus increases the likelihood of issuance failure. Moreover, Loughran and Ritter (2002) use prospect theory to argue that the positive correlation between pre-IPO market returns and price revision makes the issuer bargain less hard because they care about the change in their wealth rather than the level of wealth. The bargaining argument suggests that the valuation effect should be borne by all parties involved in the bargaining process. The uncovered valuation effect on both price revision and initial return is consistent with the bargaining explanation.
We further investigate whether the sharing of the valuation effect is related to the relative bargaining power between the issuer and investors. Because good quality IPOs are likely to have stronger relative bargaining power and initial return is a cost to the issuer, we expect the valuation effect on initial return to become stronger for good quality IPOs than for bad quality IPOs, especially when bad news is inferred from rivals' good earnings news. The IPO literature has documented the certification roles of investment bankers and venture capitalists in bringing the IPOs to the market. 7 Using the rank for underwriter reputation and whether an IPO is backed by venture capitalists as a proxy for IPO quality, we show that the valuation effect on initial return indeed becomes stronger when an IPO is underwritten by a prestigious investment bank and backed by venture capitalists.
Prior research suggests that the effect of competition in an industry depends on industrial organization.
When competition in an industry is softer (tougher), the effect of competition on firm value becomes stronger (weaker) because more (less) economic rents are to be gained or lost. To further examine whether the valuation effect is consistent with a competitive effect, we employ two proxies for the intensity of industry competition, the pre-IPO leverage and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in the industry. Chevalier Carter et al. (1998) find the long-run stock market underperformance of IPOs is less severe when the underwriter is more prestigious. Megginson and Weiss (1991) show that IPOs backed by venture capitalists are less underpriced than a controlled sample of IPOs not backed by venture capitalists and that venture capitalists retain a significant portion of their holdings after the IPO. Brav and Gompers (1997) also study the certification role of venture capitalists, see footnote 1. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market.
(1995) shows that leverage increase leads to softer product market competition. Lang and Stulz (1992) find that the competitive effect from bankruptcy announcements on non-bankrupt firms is stronger in high HHI industries. Competition in an industry is softer for high pre-IPO leverage issuers or in high HHI industries either because financial burdens reduce dimensions of competition or because concentrated industries give rise to increased market power. Consistent with a competitive effect, we find that the negative valuation effect of our signal-to-noise measure of rivals' earnings news on initial return is stronger for the IPOs with high pre-IPO leverage and tend to be stronger for the IPOs in high HHI industries.
The second objective of the paper is to investigate the consequences of the valuation effect arising from rivals' earnings news. In general, new investment opportunities and/or trading opportunities in a public market drive firms to raise capital by going public. The issuer weighs the benefits of going public against the costs of doing so. When the issuer perceives the costs outweigh the benefits, it should choose to remain private. Because rivals' earnings news positively covaries with the costs of going public as the documented negative valuation effect suggests, we expect the issuer's withdrawal probability to be positively related to rivals' earnings news. In a Probit regression analysis of the pooled sample of more than 8000 completed and withdrawn IPOs, we show that our signal-to-noise ratio measure of rivals' earnings news is positively related to the probability of an IPO being withdrawn from the market.
We further relate the effect of rivals' earnings news on completion decision to post-IPO operating performance. If post-IPO operating performance can be used as an ex-ante measure of issuers' quality, we expect it to be positively related to rivals' earnings news. The reasoning is as follows. If rivals' earnings news is positively related to the competitive pressure on the issuer and thus to the costs of going public as we argue, it should be the case in which good quality offerings account for a greater proportion of all completed offerings when rivals aggregately deliver good earnings news than when rivals aggregately deliver bad earnings news because good quality IPOs are more likely to complete in the face of strong competitive pressure. Therefore, in completed offerings we expect to find that the measure of rivals' earnings news is positively related to post-IPO operating performance. We find evidence consistent with this logic, using industry-adjusted returns on assets as the measure for operating performance. Our result on operating performance is not inconsistent with the documented long-run operating underperformance. This is because completed IPOs as a whole may underperform their industry rivals in operating performance in the post-IPO period or experience declining operating performance from the pre-IPO period to the post-IPO period, but among the completed IPOs the post-IPO performance relative to industry median can still be time-varying and perhaps mean-reverting.
Given the well-documented long-run operating underperformance, our result suggests that more weaker firms time to go public when rivals aggregately deliver bad earnings news. This goes beyond the existing literature that suggests that they do so when market valuation is high.
We are the first to examine the effect of industry rivals on the pricing process of IPOs through the lens of rivals' earnings news. Our results suggest that both investors and the issuer as well as investment banks infer fundamental information from rivals' earnings news in pricing IPOs. In light of the well-known stock and operating underperformance phenomenons for new issuers, our results suggest that competition affects IPOs through the channel of reducing profitability and that the parties involved in the IPO process may be too optimistic to unbiasedly estimate the degree of competition faced by new issuers. We show statistically and economically significant effects of rivals' earnings news on variables that are of most interest to the issuer, investment banks, and investors. One standard deviation of the signal-to-noise measure of rivals' earnings news leads to 1.40 percentage points change in price revision and 2.03 percentage points change in initial return. Further, withdrawal probability changes by up to 3.73% from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above of the average measure for rivals' earnings news, holding all non-dummy control variables at their means. Lastly, for one standard deviation increase in the measure for rivals' earnings news industry-adjusted post-IPO return on assets increases by 1.67 percentage points for the first year after the IPO, 0.87 percentage points from the IPO year to the immediate following year, and 1.36 percentage points per year for the three years following the IPO.
Our research is related to several strands of the IPO literature in finance and of the intra-industry information transfers literature in both finance and accounting. First, our study adds to the growing research in the relation between firms going public and their competitors in the same industry. On one hand, the research shows that going-public decisions may have adverse effects on publicly traded competitors. For instance, Hsu et al. (2009) show that large newly listed firms gain competitive advantages over their industry rivals. Braun and Larrain (2009) Stoughton et al. (2001) argue that IPO itself can be a signal to the market about product quality. Our results show that rival firms can adversely affect the pricing and completion of IPOs.
Second, the focus of our research on public information such as rivals' earnings news complements the extensive research in the IPO literature that emphasizes the role of private information in the pricing process.
Our study also differs from the studies that focus on the positive valuation effect of a common factor contained in such public information as pre-IPO market or industry returns because we explicitly control for such an effect.
Third, our finding of a negative valuation effect on both price revision and initial return is consistent with the well-known partial adjustment to public information phenomenon, in which offer price does not fully incorporate the public information in the issuing process, resulting in additional adjustment in initial return.
We show that the partial adjustment in our study is consistent with the view that the pricing of IPOs is a bargaining between the issuer and investors.
Fourth, our result on post-IPO operating performance suggests that poor post-IPO operating performance may at least partially result from investors and the issuer as well as investment banks underestimating the competitive environment for new issuers.
Fifth, the negative valuation effect of rivals' earnings news on IPO pricing also complements directly the intra-industry information transfers literature in accounting, in which a firm's earnings news is found to be positively related to abnormal returns to other public traded firms in the same industry and indirectly the intra-industry information transfers literature in finance, in which a contagion effect often dominates a competitive effect. The different findings may be attributed to whether the focus is on the relation among publicly traded firms in the same industry or the relation between publicly traded firms and firms going public. Since rival firms in our study are publicly traded firms, it is possible that these firms share a large common component in their earnings news but aggregately pose a competitive threat to new issuers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data, our measure of rivals' earnings news, and testing methodology. In Section 3, we report and discuss the empirical results. In Section 4, we check the robustness of our main results. In Section 5, we conclude the study. We have also tried to set all missing Carter and Manaster rank to zero. Our results are insensitive to how to deal with missing Carter and Manaster rank. Setting missing ranks to zero reduces the variation in the rank so that the coefficient on rank becomes sensitive to how to deal with missing ranks in some of our subsequent regression analysis.
12 We alleviate the influence of extreme long waiting periods by separately winsorizing the waiting period in days at the 99.5%
for each sample. If waiting period is less than 5 days, we set it to 5 days because the dates for these offerings may be prone to errors.
completed offerings than of withdrawn offerings (46% vs. 37%). In our formal tests, we control for the effects of these offer characteristics on the completion of an offering. Overall, the characteristics of our sample are broadly similar to those in the few recent IPO studies (e.g., Benveniste et al. (2003) , Lowry and Schwert (2004) , and Edelen and Kadlec (2005) vs. 0.14 ≈ 955/(5997 + 995)). To account for the difference in the two subperiods, we include a dummy for hot-issue market in our formal regression analysis.
The Industry Breakdown
Since we hypothesize that rivals' earnings news may have a competitive effect on the pricing process of IPOs, it is essential to determine the set of rival firms of an IPO. A natural criterion for rival firms seems to be the firms operating in the same Standard Industry Classification (SIC) industry. Our study employs three- Table 2 displays the industry breakdown of our sample offerings. To conserve space, we list only the top ten most IPO-populated three-digit SIC industries because a substantial fraction of the offerings concentrates in these industries. In fact, 41% (39%) of completed (withdrawn) offerings are from these industries, despite that nearly 400 (more than 200) three-digit SIC industries are represented by completed (withdrawn)
offerings. As expected, nascent industries such as computer, data processing, drugs, medical equipment, and communication equipment are among the top ten in both completed and withdrawn offerings. In the sample of completed offerings, the average initial returns in seven of the top ten industries are higher than 18.48%, the average initial return for the full sample.
Measures of Rivals' Earnings News

Definition of the Measures
Since Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) , the accounting literature primarily offers two ways of measuring earnings news. The main difference lies in how expected earnings per share (EPS) is measured.
In a seasonal random walk model of earnings process, expected EPS is realized EPS for the same quarter in the previous year. Alternatively, analyst consensus may be a good proxy for expected EPS because analysts should incorporate information from their research when making earnings forecasts. As stock analysts tend to follow larger firms in an industry, using analyst consensus will exclude many smaller firms, which are likely to be close competitors to the IPO firm. In this study, we follow Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) to compute earnings surprises from a seasonal random walk model but check the robustness of the main results using earnings surprises from analyst forecasts.
Because the IPO literature suggests that information revealed in the bookbuilding period is important in determining offer price and underpricing, we concentrate on earnings surprises from rival firms during this period. Following the accounting literature, we standardize earnings surprises to make them comparable across firms and over time. Standardized Unexpected Earning (SUE) is defined as
where EPS it and E(EPS it ) are reported EPS and expected EPS for firm i in quarter t, respectively; P it is the stock price of firm i at the end of quarter t. There are two types of reported EPS, one with special items and one without these items. Since special items are temporary in nature, SUE based on EPS excluding special items should be more informative about a firm's normal operations.
We compute two types of SUE based on EPS with and without special items. Then for each type of SUE, we define aggregate rivals' earnings surprises for an IPO as
where n i and m j are the number of rival firms making earnings announcements and the number of earnings announcements that rival firm j makes during the bookbuilding period of IPO i, respectively. 13 We use the sum of SUEs rather than the average of SUEs because we want to capture the total information not the average information per announcement from competitors' earnings announcements during the waiting period.
To measure the variability of competitors' earnings surprises, we calculate the standard deviation of these earnings surprises. Specifically,
where MSUE i is the average SUE of rival firms during the bookbuilding period of IPO i. STDSUE can be considered as an auxiliary measure to our SUMSUE measure because large variation in rivals' earnings news should reduce the information content of and thus the valuation effect from rivals' earnings news.
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To construct a single measure of rivals' earnings news for our tests, we define a signal-to-noise measure for IPO i as
The signal-to-noise measure captures the fundamental information revealed from rivals' earnings news. We use Snratio 1 and Snratio 2 to denote the measure based on earnings with and without special items, respectively.
13 To reduce the influence of outliers in our aggregate earnings surprises, we pool all SUEs from Compustat firms and winsorize them at the 1/99 percentile.
14 We require at least 5 SUEs from rival firms to compute the standard deviation. If there are less than 5 SUEs, we set SUMSUE, STDSUE, and the resulting signal-to-noise measure to be zero.
The measure of earnings expectation may be subject to bias or noise. As a check of whether our main results are sensitive to the measure of earnings expectation, a crude signal-to-noise measure is created from decile ranks of earnings surprises. Specifically, we follow Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) to sort SUEs into decile ranks from 0 to 9 and then convert the ranks to a range from -0.5 to 0.5 by dividing decile ranks by 9 and subtracting 0.5. We denote the resulting ranks of SUEs by DSUEs. The aggregate competitors' earnings surprises and the standard deviation of the earnings surprises based on DSUEs are constructed in the same fashion as in equation (2) and (3), respectively. Similarly, we use Sndratio 1 and Sndratio 2 to denote the measures based on earnings with and without special items, respectively. Since we trade off precision of earnings news with less dependence on earnings expectation in the crude signal-to-noise measure, the crude measure should be less informative.
Summary Statistics of the Measures
In Panel A and B of Table 3 , we report summary statistics for our signal-to-noise measure of rivals' earnings news in the non-hot-issue market and the hot-issue market, respectively. In Panel A, we find that Snratio has a median of 0 for both completed and withdrawn offerings, regardless of whether Snratio is computed from EPS with or without special items. The average Snratio based on EPS with special items is slightly positive for both types of offerings but not statistically different from zero. The average Snratio based on EPS without special items is significantly positive for both types of offerings, suggesting that special items on average reduce SUMSUE more than STDSUE. We find that the standard deviation of Snratio is about twice as large in withdrawn offerings as is in completed offerings. We also find that there are three times as many earnings surprises in completed offerings as in withdrawn offerings. These differences are mainly driven by the longer waiting period of withdrawn offerings because the variation in and the number of rivals' earnings news increase with the length of waiting period.
In Panel B, we find that mean and median Snratio are significantly negative in both completed and withdrawn offerings, regardless of whether Snratio is computed from EPS with or without special items. In addition, there is much more earnings news in the waiting period from rivals in the hot-issue market than in the non-hot-issue market. As shown in Table 1 , the greater number of earnings news may be explained by the fact that offerings in the hot-issue market are concentrated in a few high-tech industries and have longer waiting periods. The negative mean and median Snratio suggest that rival firms on average deliver worse-than-expected earnings in the hot-issue period.
The patterns of summary statistics for Sndratio based on EPS with or without special items in Panel A and B follow closely those for Snratio based on the same EPS. Overall, Table 1 and 3 show that there are high average initial return and low average Snratio in the hot-issue market. To avoid a result driven by the difference between non-hot-issue and hot-issue markets, we include a dummy for the hot-issue market in the regressions for pricing effects.
Methodology
Testing for the Competitive Effect on IPO Pricing
To test for the competitive effect on the pricing of IPOs, we need to control for the pre-IPO market condition and offer characteristics. Following Lowry and Schwert (2004) and Edelen and Kadlec (2005) , among many others, we carry out the tests in both price revision and underpricing regressions by including the signal-tonoise measure. Specifically, the augmented price revision regression is specified as
where ∆P i is the percentage price revision from the mid-point of filing range to the offer price; R The augmented underpricing regression is similarly specified as
where IR i is the initial return of IPO i; Priv i is the residual from regression (5) for IPO i and measures private information revealed during the bookbuilding period.
In both price revision and underpricing regressions, we check the robustness to an alternative measure of competitors' earnings news by replacing Snratio with Sndratio. By our central hypothesis, we expect to find α 1 < 0 in the price revision regression and β 1 < 0 in the underpricing regression.
The pre-IPO leverage should increase the sensitivity of the issuing firm's equity value to the measure of rivals' earnings news. The degree of industry competition, on the other hand, should decrease this sensitivity.
We investigate these effects by interacting the signal-to-noise ratio measure with two dummy variables. HHI indicates a highly concentrated industry, in which market power reduces competition. We use total annual sales to compute HHI for an industry. Because a significant portion of IPOs is concentrated in a few industries as shown in Table 2 , these industries will be overweighted in a regression using all individual IPOs.
To mitigate this issue, we take averages of price revisions, initial returns, the pre-IPO market conditions, and offer characteristics for the IPOs in the same industry and in each month of the sample period. Snratio are re-computed using rivals' earnings surprises in the preceding month. Interaction terms Snratio × Dleverage and Snratio × DHHI are included one at a time in a regression similar to (6). We expect the coefficient on each interaction term to be negative. We should note that Ali et al. (2009) argue that HHI based on public firms in Compustat introduces measurement errors because many private firms in an industry are excluded.
The measurement error problem may, however, bias against finding the valuation effect of rivals' earnings news attributed to industry concentration in nascent industries, in which most IPOs domicile and the ratio of public to private firms should be low.
Since rivals' earnings surprises are public information and thus known to both the issuer and potential investors, the issuer and investors should share the resulting valuation effect because each party involved has some bargaining power. Carter et al. (1998) Snratio × D High Offer Price in a regression similar to (6). Again, we expect the coefficient on each interaction term to be negative.
Testing for the Competitive Effect on IPO Withdrawal
We employ a Probit regression to further investigate the effect of rivals' earnings news on the completion decision in a pooled sample of completed and withdrawn offerings. The set of control variables for offer characteristics and market conditions essentially remain the same, except that we remove the weekly returns to an equally-weighted portfolio of recently issued IPOs before filing date because none of them are significant in a preliminary analysis. Since the longer waiting period for withdrawn IPOs may induce a spurious positive relation between waiting-period industry returns and withdrawal probability, we use instead relative returns, RelMkt i , to measure the pre-IPO market condition. As in Benveniste et al. (2003) , relative returns are defined
, where R I and R m are industry returns and equally-weighted market returns during the waiting period, respectively. Industry returns are computed as in (5) and (6). Following Edelen and Kadlec (2005) , we also add to the Probit regression withdrawal rate, which is the ratio of the number of withdrawn
IPOs to the number of completed IPOs in the 90-day period preceding an IPO's offering or withdrawal date.
The withdrawal rate captures the potential spillover effect from other IPOs' withdrawal.
The Probit regression is specified as
where Prob(w = 1) is the withdrawal probability of an offering; Relmkt i and WR i are relative returns and withdrawal rate, respectively. If rivals' earnings news is positively related to the competitive pressure and thus the costs of going public, we expect to find that γ 1 > 0.
Implication for Post-IPO Operating Performance
In relating rivals' earnings news to post-IPO operating performance, we focus on return on asset (ROA) as the performance measure. 16 We examine how rivals' earnings news is related to an IPO's ROA in the first fiscal year and average ROA in the first three fiscal years following the IPO fiscal year. We also examine the effect of rivals' earnings news on the change in ROA from the IPO fiscal year to the immediate following fiscal year. All performance measures are adjusted for the industry median in the same year to account for year and industry-specific effects.
In addition to offer characteristics and the pre-IPO market condition, we control for the issuer's size and age in the IPO year, fraction of shares sold, offer price, and private information revealed in the bookbuilding 16 Using return on equity or operating cash flow on asset gives qualitatively similar results.
period and in the first trading day. 17 The industry-adjusted performance regression is specified as 
where AdjROA is the industry-adjusted ROA; Size is the logarithm of total assets in millions in the IPO fiscal year; Shares sold is the fraction of shares sold in an IPO; Private1 and Private2 are the regression residuals from (5) and (6) and capture private information revealed in the book building period and in the first trading day, respectively. If good quality IPOs are more likely to complete in the face of high costs of going public induced by rivals' earnings news, we expect to find ω 1 > 0.
Empirical Results
The Competitive Effect on IPO Pricing
We report the results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) price revision regression (5) in Table 4 . We find that the signal-to-noise measure has a significantly negative effect on price revision. Table 5 presents the results of the OLS underpricing regression (6). As is on price revision, a strong negative effect of rivals' earnings news is found on initial return. These results support our hypothesis for a competitive effect, which is shared by both the issuer and investors as well as investment banks.
A comparison of the coefficients on the signal-to-noise measure from Model 1 in Table 4 and 5, we find that the absolute value of the coefficient in the underpricing regression is about 45% (0.00109 vs. 0.00075) larger than that in the price revision regression. Using the standard deviation of the signal-to-noise measure for all completed offerings (18.63) and holding all other variables constant, we find that for one standard deviation change in the signal-to-noise measure the economic effects on price revision and initial return are 1.40 and 2.03 percentage points, respectively. Since the average price revision is essentially zero as we note in summary statistics, the economic effect on price revision is material. In addition, the economic effect 17 We assume that overallotment options, if any, are not exercised.
on initial return accounts for a sizable portion (about 11%) of the average initial return (18.48%). These economic effects suggest that investors bear a larger fraction of the total valuation effect (3.04 percentage points) than the issuer. In Model 3 of Table 4 and Table 5 , we use the signal-to-noise measure based on EPS with special items. We find a total of 3.51 percentage points valuation effect with a split of 1.65 percentage points on the issuer and of 1.87 percentage point on investors. In Model 2 and 4 of Table 4 and 5, the crude measures of rivals' earnings news are also loaded with significantly negative coefficients. As expected, the level of significance is greatly reduced and becomes marginal in Model 4 of Table 5 . These results indicate that the negative valuation effect is quite robust to the mismeasurement of earnings expectations. We further discuss this issue in Section 5.
In Table 4 , the coefficients on the control variables are largely consistent with the previous literature. For example, the industry return during the waiting period has a significantly positive effect on price revision, suggesting that the IPO's valuation is subject to a common factor. The coefficient on Carter and Manaster rank is significantly positive. This may be because reputable underwriters set the filing price range more conservatively. Price revision is marginally positively affected by venture capitalist backing. This may be attributed to venture capitalists' strong bargaining power. We also find high-tech IPOs have a larger price revision. Since high-tech IPOs are typically riskier, it is likely that these IPOs set a lower filing price to help promote the sales of new shares. Filing amount significantly reduces the price revision, suggesting investment banks keep the offer price more conservatively for larger issues. Consistent with Lowry and Schwert (2004), we find that the public information in the pre-filing period is not fully incorporated into the filing price. The weekly return to an equally-weighted portfolio of recently issued IPOs in each of the two weeks preceding the filing date has a significantly positive effect on price revision. Lastly, the dummy for the hot-issue market is highly significantly positive as we have expected, reflecting a larger price revision in the hot-issue period.
In Table 5 , we find that private information extracted from price revision regression is positively related to initial return and explains a substantial portion of its variation, consistent with the theory in Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and the empirical study in Hanley (1993) . In addition, we also find that the market return during the waiting period has a significantly positive effect on initial return, consistent with partial adjustment to public information. However, Carter and Manaster rank has no effect on initial return. This is consistent with Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) 's argument that investment bank is endogenously determined.
Similarly, venture capitalist backing has no effect on initial return. This result appears to be inconsistent with the certification role of venture capitalists advocated in Megginson and Weiss (1991) . percentage points will result from whether an IPO has above-the-median offer price. In unreported results, we find a negative but insignificant marginal valuation effect on price revision. These results are consistent with the explanation that the sharing of the valuation effect depends on the relative bargain power.
The significantly negative coefficients in Model 3 and 4 reveal that the valuation effect is related to pre-IPO leverage and industry concentration measured by HHI. The absolute value of the coefficient (0.00279) on the interaction term in Model 3 is nearly three times as large as the coefficient on the signal-to-noise measure Table 7 reports the results of the Probit regression (7). Indeed, we find that both measures of rivals' earnings surprises significantly increase an offering's withdrawal probability after controlling for offer characteristics and the pre-IPO market condition. The result supports our hypothesis that rivals' earnings news is positively related to the competitive pressure on firms going public, which increases the withdrawal probability.
The Competitive Effect on Withdrawal Probability
We evaluate economic significance by calculating the change in withdraw probability resulting from a change from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the average signal-to-noise measure while holding all nondummy variables at their means and dummy variables at either 0 or 1. We find that for less known offerings the withdraw probabilities are 2.73% during the hot-issue period and 3.73% during the non-hot-issue period. The less known offerings are those offerings that are not backed by venture capitalists or carved out from another public traded firm, do not intend to list on the three major markets (i.e., NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq), and are not in high-tech industries. If an offering is well-known, the withdrawal probability is less than 1% regardless of whether it is in the hot-issue period. The well-known offerings are those that are backed by venture capitalists, intend to list on the three major markets, and are in high-tech industries. Therefore, the less-known offerings are affected the most by rivals' earnings news during the non-hot-issue period whereas the well-known offerings are affected little. Because the less-known offerings are more likely to be sensitive to the costs of going public, the results suggest that rivals' earnings news positively covaries with the costs of going public. Given other independent variables such as relative market returns, underwriter reputation, venture capitalist backing, and listing exchanges are the main determinants of the completion of an offering, the economic effect on withdrawal is appreciable for the less-known offerings.
Combined with the pricing effects, these results suggest that the valuations for some offerings fall below issuers' reservation prices in the face of rivals' strengthened competitive positions so that issuers withdraw the offerings from the market.
Consistent with Benveniste et al. (2003) and Edelen and Kadlec (2005) , we find that the market condition during the waiting period is negatively related to withdrawal probability, suggesting that more IPOs are likely to withdraw from the market when the industry return is low. Carter and Manaster rank and venture capitalist backing reduce withdrawal probability, consistent with the certification roles of investment banks and venture capitalists. Equity carved-out lowers withdrawal probability because these offerings are less riskier. The three exchange dummies are all significantly negative, suggesting that the offerings intend to list on the three markets are more established and thus less riskier than the rest of the offerings. Whether an offering is from a high-tech industry has no effect on withdrawal probability beyond the effects of other independent variables. Interestingly, we find that larger issues are more likely to withdraw, maybe because opportunistic issuers are likely to file large issuance. The withdrawal rate apparently increases withdrawal probability, indicating that the withdrawal decision is affected by information spillover from the offerings that are subject to a common factor but are withdrawn earlier. The dummy for the hot-issue market is highly significantly positive, confirming the pattern in Table 1 that a higher portion of the offerings is withdrawn in the hot-issue period. Table 8 presents the results of the OLS operating performance regression (8). In Model 1 to 3, we find that the measure of rivals' earnings surprises based on EPS with special items has a positive effect on the industry-adjusted post-IPO operating performance, regardless of whether we measure industry-adjusted ROA in the first fiscal year or in the first three fiscal years following the IPO fiscal year or whether we measure industry-adjusted change in ROA from the IPO fiscal year to the first fiscal year after the offering. Model 4
Implication for Post-IPO Operating Performance
shows that the results are essentially the same for the alternative measure based on EPS excluding special items. Since our post-IPO operating performance is adjusted for the industry median for the same year, the results show that rivals' good earnings news predicts good relative performance of an offering, conditional on the completion of the offering. In conjunction with the documented effect of rivals' earnings news on withdrawal probability, our results suggest that the competitive effect selects relatively good quality IPOs to the market. of shares sold can be used as a proxy for the fraction of shares retained by the management of the firm, the result implies a negative relation between post-IPO performance and shares retained by the management, in contrast to the previous findings that either a positive relation (see Jain and Kini (1994) ) or no relation (see Mikkelson et al. (1997) ) is found. Offer price is also positively related to post-IPO performance. This can be explained by the information spillover story in Alti (2005) that good quality IPOs have high offer prices. We find that the private information revealed during the waiting period and during the first trading day has a negative effect on industry-adjusted ROA. These results would be puzzling because positive private information should predict good post-IPO relative performance. Since we measure private information as the residuals from the regressions of price revision or initial return on offer characteristics and pre-offer market conditions, it is possible that the residuals also capture investors' overoptimism, which is not realized in post-IPO performance. Carter and Manaster rank has a positive effect on the post-IPO performance, consistent with the certification role of investment banks. The dummy for venture capitalist backing is negatively related to post-IPO performance. This may be because venture capitalists are more likely to bring growth firms to the market and these firms are often less profitable in the first few years after going public. Equity carved-out is positively related to post-IPO performance because these firms are more mature. IPOs listed on the three markets have better post-IPO performance because the listing requirements from these markets are stricter than small capitalization market and OTC market. High-tech dummy has a negative coefficient, and this may be explained by the large R&D expenditure incurred by high-tech firms in early years. Large filing amount reduces post-IPO performance, perhaps because firms filing a large amount are more likely to be young and growth firms, holding constant total assets and the fraction of shares to be sold in IPOs.
4 Robustness Checks
Fama-French 48 Industries
Our results are based on three-digit SIC industries. We rerun the price revision and initial return regressions with newly defined the signal-to-noise measure of rivals' earnings news based on Fama-French 48 industries.
In unreported results, we find that the negative relation between the measure of rivals' earnings surprises and the pricing of IPOs remains significant, although the economic magnitude is slightly reduced. This makes sense because if the competition primarily occurs in narrowly defined three-digit SIC industries rather than in broadly defined Fama-French 48 industries, the measure from broadly defined industries are likely to be noisier.
Alternative Measures of Earnings News
In our reported test results, we measure earnings surprises using a seasonal random walk model because doing so helps utilize as many publicly traded rivals as possible. We show that the main results qualitatively hold even for a crude measure of earnings surprises. We further check whether our results are sensitive to alternative measures of earnings surprises. First, we use analysts' consensus as expected EPS. Because analysts' forecasts typically incorporate recent information beyond the information contained in the EPS from the same quarter in the previous year, the variation in earnings surprises based on analysts' forecasts should be smaller. As a result, we are likely to find a stronger valuation effect from this measure. In unreported results, we find that this is indeed the case. Second, SUE measures use quarter end price as the scaler, which is likely to be affected by the pre-IPO market condition. Instead, we use quarter end price one year before the earnings announcement or expected EPS from a seasonal random walk model as the scaler, and the main results are qualitatively similar.
Furthermore, we replace the signal-to-noise measure with its signal and noise components. The signal component measures rivals' aggregate earnings news and the noise component measures the variation in rivals' earnings news. We find that the signal (noise) component has a significant negative (positive) effect on the pricing of IPOs, consistent with our central hypothesis.
Sample Selection Bias
Since the signal-to-noise measure has a significant positive effect on withdrawal probability, the regression results for price revision and initial return in completed offerings are likely to be affected by selection bias.
Edelen and Kadlec (2005) argue a similar point in the pre-IPO returns of comparable firms. Because a negative correlation between the signal-to-noise measure and the residual from the price revision regression may result from completed offerings, there may be a bias towards finding a negative coefficient on the signal-to-noise measure. A similar logic applies to the underpricing regression. We use Heckman's two-step procedure to re-estimate our main results for price revision and initial return with bootstrapped standard errors. We find that the coefficients are essentially unchanged and still highly significant. The inverse mill ratio is only significantly negative in the underpricing regression.
Sensitivities to Selected Control Variables and Subsamples
In our results, we use returns to a portfolio of all public traded firms in the same three-digit SIC industry to capture an industry-wide common factor. Alternatively, we could use market returns to capture a marketwide common factor or returns to a portfolio of recently issued IPOs to capture a common factor to all IPOs.
We replace the returns to the industry portfolio with these alternative measures and find that our main results are qualitatively unchanged.
As shown in Table 2 , the sample of offerings are highly concentrated in a few industries. To check whether our results are particularly driven by a few industries, we exclude the offerings in the top three three-digit SIC industries one at a time and find qualitatively similar results. We also check whether our main results are driven by the offerings that do not intend to list on either of the three major markets (i.e., NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq). The results are qualitatively invariant. Lastly, we restrict the completed and withdrawn offerings to those completed or withdrawn within 123 days of initial filing because offerings completed or withdrawn after a longer period are likely to have different characteristics. We still find similar results.
Conclusions
This paper examines the valuation effect of an important component of public information, rivals' earnings news, on the pricing process of IPOs, the decision to complete an IPO, and the implication for post-IPO operating performance. Rivals' earnings news reveals fundamental information not only about rival firms but also about firms going public. The information spillover could result in a contagion effect and a competitive effect. The contagion effect arises from a common valuation factor whereas the competitive effect stems from a shift in an industry's competitive balance. We hypothesize that IPOs as a whole may be in weak competitive positions relative to their more established rival firms so that rivals' good earnings news may imply bad news for firms going public. We find that controlling for a common valuation factor and offer characteristics, the signal-to-noise measure of rivals' earnings news has a significant negative valuation effect on both price revision and initial return. The results support our central hypothesis and suggest that parties involved in the issuance share the negative valuation effect as a result of bargaining. Moreover, we show that investors bear a larger fraction of the economic valuation effect than the issuer.
We provide further evidence that the negative valuation effect strengthens for high pre-IPO leverage offerings and offerings in highly concentrated industries, consistent with the view that the competitive effect becomes stronger when industry competition is softer. In addition, we show that the negative valuation effect on initial return strengthens when the IPO is underwritten by prestigious investment banks and is backed by venture capitalists and when the IPO has a high offer price, consistent with the explanation that good quality
IPOs have strong bargaining power. Since the negative valuation effect increases the costs of going public, we further hypothesize that an offering's withdrawal probability increases with the measure of rivals' earnings news. Consistent with the hypothesis, we show that the less-known offerings are more likely to withdraw than the well-know offerings in the face of rivals' good earnings news. An implication of the negative valuation and withdrawal effects is that rivals' good earnings news is associated with good post-IPO operating performance because good quality IPOs are more likely to complete in the face of a competitive threat. Empirically, we find that a positive relation between the measure of rivals' earnings news and the industry-adjusted post-IPO operating performance.
Overall, our findings suggest that in the pricing process of IPOs the issuer and investors respond to the fundamental public information revealed from rivals' earnings news in a way consistent with the partial adjustment to public information phenomenon in the IPO literature. But the documented negative valuation effect differs from the contagion effect mostly documented in the intra-industry information transfers literature in accounting and finance. Further, prior studies explain the long-run stock return and operating underperformance as a combination of investors' optimism and issuers' timing. Our results suggest that investors' optimism may stem from underestimation of the competitive environment in which new issuers operate. In light of our results on post-IPO performance and the long-run stock return underformance, investors appear to underestimate the priced risk more than profitability. Since short-term investors are likely to overlook the long-run risk and profitability, promoting long-term investors may mitigate the long-run underperformance of IPOs. We exclude from the sample of completed IPOs closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts, American Depository Receipts, non-US domiciled firms, unit offerings, master limited partnerships, those with a mid-point filing price less than $1, those with an offer price less than $5, and those not listed on NYSE, American Stock Exchange, Nasdaq, Small Capitalization Market, or Over-the-Counter securities market (OTC). We apply a similar filter to select the sample of withdrawn IPOs except that we remove the offer price restriction and drop the IPOs withdrawn within 2 days after filing, and that we allow the IPOs without an intended listing exchange. Mid-point filing price is the mid-point of the filing price range. Filing amount (in 1983 dollars) is the mid-point filing price times the number of shares filed. Offer price revision is the offer price minus the mid-point filing price, divided by the mid-point filing price. Initial return is the closing price of the first trading day within the first week following the IPO date minus the offer price, divided by the offer price. We rely on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for closing price, and if the closing price is not available from the CRSP we use the price reported by SDC. Waiting period in days is the offer date minus the filing date. If an IPO has a missing filing date, we use the annual median waiting period in days and offer date to estimate the filing date. We alleviate the influence of extreme long waiting period by winsorizing the waiting period in days at the 99.5% for each sample. If waiting period is less than 5 days, we set it to 5 days. Filing dates for the IPOs with adjusted waiting periods are reset accordingly. Proceeds (in 1983 dollars) is the offer price times the number of shares sold. Carter and Manaster rank is a measure of underwriter quality with a range of 0 to 9. We set missing Carter and Manaster rank to the median Carter and Manaster rank of the IPOs listed on the same exchange. NYSE, American, Nasdaq, and Others are exchange dummies. Venture capital, equity carved-out, and hi-tech are dummy variables indicating whether an IPO is backed by venture capitalist, whether an IPO is an equity carved-out, and whether an IPO is from high-tech industries as defined by SDC, respectively. Hot-issue market refers to the IPO market in 1999 and 2000 for completed offerings and in 1999, 2000, and 2001 for withdrawn offerings. Non-hot-issue market refers to the IPO market for each type of offerings in the remaining years over the sample period. This table presents summary statistics of signal-to-noise ratios constructed from rivals' standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) during an IPO's waiting period. Signal-to-noise ratio is defined as the sum of rivals' SUEs divided by the standard deviation of the SUEs. We define rival firms of an IPO as those from the same three-digit SIC industry. We assume that earnings per share (EPS) follows a seasonal random walk, and thus expected EPS for a quarter is the realized EPS for the same quarter of the previous year. SUE for a quarter is realized EPS minus expected EPS, divided by the share price at the quarter end. SUE measures make unexpected quarterly earnings comparable across firms and over time. Snratio1 and Snratio2 denote signal-to-noise ratios based on SUEs computed from EPS with and without special items, respectively. Sndratio1 and Sndratio2 denote signal-to-noise ratios based on the decile ranks of SUEs computed from EPS with and without special items, respectively. The decile rank of SUE is obtained by first sorting all SUEs for all Compustat firms into deciles with 0 being the lowest and 9 being the highest and then dividing the resulting decile by 9 and subtracting 0.5. To ensure that there is a sufficient number of SUEs for computing the standard deviation of SUEs, we require an IPO to have at least five SUEs from rivals. Otherwise, we assume the sum, standard deviation, signal-to-noise ratio, and the number of SUEs to be zero. We report summary statistics for non-hot-issue market and hot-issue market in Panel A This table presents the effect of signal-to-noise ratios constructed from rivals' earnings news on price revisions of completed IPOs in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. Signal-to-noise ratio is defined as the sum of rivals' standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) divided by the standard deviation of the SUEs. We define rival firms of an IPO as those from the same three-digit SIC industry. We assume that earnings per share (EPS) follows a seasonal random walk, and thus expected EPS for a quarter is the realized EPS for the same quarter of the previous year. SUE for a quarter is realized EPS minus expected EPS, divided by the share price at the quarter end. SUE measures make unexpected quarterly earnings comparable across firms and over time. Snratio1 and Snratio2 denote signal-to-noise ratios based on SUEs computed from EPS with and without special items, respectively. Sndratio1 and Sndratio2 denote signal-to-noise ratios based on the decile ranks of SUEs computed from EPS with and without special items, respectively. The decile rank of SUE is obtained by first sorting all SUEs for all Compustat firms into deciles with 0 being the lowest and 9 being the highest and then dividing the resulting decile by 9 and subtracting 0.5. To ensure that there is a sufficient number of SUEs for computing the standard deviation of SUEs, we require an IPO to have at least five SUEs from rivals. Otherwise, we assume the sum, standard deviation, signal-to-noise ratio, and the number of SUEs to be zero. Market is the return during an IPO's waiting period to an equally-weighted portfolio of rival firms with monthly rebalancing. Carter and Manaster rank is a measure of underwriter quality with a range of 0 to 9. We set missing This table presents the effect of signal-to-noise ratios constructed from rivals' earnings news on initial returns of completed IPOs in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. Signal-to-noise ratio is defined as the sum of rivals' standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) divided by the standard deviation of the SUEs. We define rival firms of an IPO as those from the same three-digit SIC industry. We assume that earnings per share (EPS) follows a seasonal random walk, and thus expected EPS for a quarter is the realized EPS for the same quarter of the previous year. SUE for a quarter is realized EPS minus expected EPS, divided by the share price at the quarter end. SUE measures make unexpected quarterly earnings comparable across firms and over time. Snratio1 and Snratio2 denote signal-to-noise ratios based on SUEs computed from EPS with and without special items, respectively. Sndratio1 and Sndratio2 denote signal-to-noise ratios based on the decile ranks of SUEs computed from EPS with and without special items, respectively. The decile rank of SUE is obtained by first sorting all SUEs for all Compustat firms into deciles with 0 being the lowest and 9 being the highest and then dividing the resulting decile by 9 and subtracting 0.5. To ensure that there is a sufficient number of SUEs for computing the standard deviation of SUEs, we require an IPO to have at least five SUEs from rivals. Otherwise, we assume the sum, standard deviation, signal-to-noise ratio, and the number of SUEs to be zero. Private is the price revision orthogonalized with respect to other independent variables and measures the variation of price revision not attributed to other independent variables. Market is the return during an IPO's waiting period to an equally-weighted portfolio of rival firms with monthly rebalancing. Carter and Manaster rank is a measure of underwriter quality with a range of 0 to 9. We set missing This table presents the effect of signal-to-noise ratios constructed from rivals' earnings news on withdrawal probability in Probit regression models. We model the withdrawal probability of an IPO as a Probit function of market condition, signal-to-noise ratio constructed from rivals' earnings news, and offer characteristics. Signal-to-noise ratio is defined as the sum of rivals' standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) divided by the standard deviation of the SUEs. We define rival firms of an IPO as those from the same three-digit SIC industry. We assume that earnings per share (EPS) follows a seasonal random walk, and thus expected EPS for a quarter is the realized EPS for the same quarter of the previous year. SUE for a quarter is realized EPS minus expected EPS, divided by the share price at the quarter end. SUE measures make unexpected quarterly earnings comparable across firms and over time. Snratio1 and Snratio2 denote signal-to-noise ratios based on SUEs computed from EPS with and without special items, respectively. To ensure that there is a sufficient number of SUEs for computing the standard deviation of SUEs, we require an IPO to have at least five SUEs from rivals. Otherwise, we assume the sum, standard deviation, signal-to-noise ratio, and the number of SUEs to be zero. Relative market is the ratio of one plus the return during an IPO's waiting period to an equally-weighted portfolio of rival firms with monthly rebalancing to one plus the equally-weighted market return during the same period. Carter and Manaster rank is a measure of underwriter quality with a range of 0 to 9. We set missing Carter and Manaster rank to the median Carter and Manaster rank of the IPOs listed on the same exchange. NYSE, American, Nasdaq, and Others are exchange dummies. Venture capital, equity carved-out, and hi-tech are dummy variables indicating whether an IPO is backed by venture capitalist, whether an IPO is an equity carved-out, and whether an IPO is from high-tech industries as defined by SDC, respectively. Withdrawal rate is the ratio of the number of withdrawn IPOs in the 90-day period preceding an IPO's offer or withdrawal date to the number of completed IPOs in the same period. To minimize the effect on withdrawal rate of the discrepancy between the date when the withdrawal decision is made and the observed withdrawal date, we require withdrawn IPOs to be those withdrawn within 123 days of filing. Hot-issue market refers to the IPO market in 1999 and 2000 for completed offerings and in 1999, 2000, and 2001 for withdrawn offerings. Coefficients on Snratio1 and Snratio2 are multiplied by 100. We report the t-statistics of coefficients in parentheses. This table presents the effect of signal-to-noise ratios constructed from rivals' earnings news on industry-adjusted post-IPO profitability of completed IPOs in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. Signal-to-noise ratio is defined as the sum of rivals' standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) divided by the standard deviation of the SUEs. We define rival firms of an IPO as those from the same three-digit SIC industry. We assume that earnings per share (EPS) follows a seasonal random walk, and thus expected EPS for a quarter is the realized EPS for the same quarter of the previous year. SUE for a quarter is realized EPS minus expected EPS, divided by the share price at the quarter end. SUE measures make unexpected quarterly earnings comparable across firms and over time. Snratio1 and Snratio2 denote signal-to-noise ratios based on SUEs computed from EPS with and without special items, respectively. We use return on assets (income before extraordinary items divided by total assets) in the years following the IPO fiscal year to measure post-IPO profitability. We also use the change in return on assets from the IPO fiscal year to the following fiscal year to measure the post-IPO change in profitability. All our profitability measures are adjusted for the same-period industry medians to remove the year and industry fixed effects. Size is the logarithm of total assets (in millions) in the IPO fiscal year. Age is the number of years between founding and going public. Fraction of shares offered is the number of shares sold in an IPO, divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Private-price revision is the price revision orthogonalized with respect to other independent variables (not including initial return) and measures the variation of price revision not attributed to other independent variables. Private-initial return is the initial return orthogonalized with respect to other independent variables and measures the variation of initial return not attributed to other independent variables. Market is the return during an IPO's waiting period to an equallyweighted portfolio of rival firms with monthly rebalancing. Carter and Manaster rank is a measure of underwriter quality with a range of 0 to 9. We set missing Carter and Manaster rank to the median Carter and Manaster rank of the IPOs listed on the same exchange. NYSE, American, Nasdaq, and Others are exchange dummies. Venture capital, equity carved-out, and hi-tech are dummy variables indicating whether an IPO is backed by venture capitalist, whether an IPO is an equity carved-out, and whether an IPO is from high-tech industries as defined by SDC, respectively. Coefficients on Snratio1 and Snratio2 are multiplied by 100. Reported t-statistics for the coefficients are obtained from heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
